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This article discusses the current ‘popularity’ of trauma research in the Human-
ities and examines the ethics and politics of trauma theory, as exemplified in the
writings of Caruth and Felman and Laub. Written from a position informed by
Laplanchian and object relations psychoanalytic theory, it begins by examining
and offering a critique of trauma theory’s model of subjectivity, and its rela-
tions with theories of referentiality and representation, history and testimony.
Next, it proposes that although trauma theory’s subject matter— the sufferings
of others—makes critique difficult, the theory’s politics, its exclusions and
inclusions, and its unconscious drives and desires are as deserving of attention
as those of any other theory. Arguing that the political and cultural contexts
within which this theory has risen to prominence have remained largely unex-
amined, the article concludes by proposing that trauma theory needs to act as
a brake against rather than as a vehicle for cultural and political Manicheanism.
Keywords: trauma theory; culture; ethics; politics; memory; subjectivity;
history
Since the early 1990s, trauma’s star has been rising within the academic
firmament. If academic fashions and fascinations can be linked with
publications then the growth of interest in trauma within the human-
ities can certainly be mapped by reference to the publication of partic-
ular texts that have since become seminal within the field: Shoshana
Felman and Dori Laub’s Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature,
Psychoanalysis and Historywas published in 1992, Cathy Caruth’s edited
collection Trauma: Explorations in Memory in 1995 and her monograph
Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History in 1996.1 These are
undoubtedly the books which opened up the Humanities to trauma.
But books do not make their mark in a vacuum. Their impact and
influence stems, to a large degree, from the contexts within which
they are read and received. Pointing to influential texts raises ques-
tions, then, concerning both the academic and cultural contexts into
which these books emerged and the part played by these contexts
in the consequent adoption, canonization and development within
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the Humanities of the theories and perspectives disseminated by these
volumes. Though the rise of cultural movements and moods serves as
the object of study for cultural and social studies, the ascendance of
theories and ideas within the Humanities themselves is less commonly
placed under such scrutiny. This essay’s aim, then, is to consider the
rise of trauma theory within its academic contexts and to open up
some discussion of the promise and limitations of trauma theory.
The term ‘trauma theory’ first appears in Caruth’s Unclaimed Expe-
rience (72). In the following essay, I use the term to refer primarily
to the work of Caruth, and to that of Felman and Laub, whose
writings on trauma are showcased in Caruth’s collection Trauma:
Explorations In Memory, and whose significance to Caruth is marked by
an acknowledgement to Felman in Caruth’s Unclaimed Experience (ix).
Trauma theory, as several of the contributors noted in ‘Special Debate:
Trauma and Screen Studies’, a dossier on trauma which I edited and
introduced,2 presages movement beyond a series of apparent theo-
retical impasses. However, the rise of what is becoming almost a
new theoretical orthodoxy invites— requires, even, perhaps— some
reflection on and reflexivity concerning its implications and contexts,
as well as some consideration of the paths not taken by trauma theory.
This essay aims to encourage, then, an engaged and critical relationship
to what has become known as ‘trauma theory’, and to question what
I have called ‘the apparently oxymoronic ‘‘popularity’’ of trauma’
(TD, 189).
The Academic Context for Trauma Studies
The category of ‘trauma theory’ is now referred to frequently in
writings in the Humanities.3 Though there are repeated references
to this theory, its provenance and reach are, however, rarely traced.
The trauma theory developed in the writings of Caruth and Felman
and Laub owes much, on the one hand, to deconstruction, post-
structuralism and psychoanalysis. But it is also informed by (mainly
US-based) clinical work with survivors of experiences designated as
traumatic. This combination of influences can be traced through the
contents of Caruth’s Trauma: Explorations in Memory which includes,
alongside chapters by Felman and Laub, contributions by the neuro-
scientists Van der Kolk and Van der Hart and the literary theorists
Georges Bataille and Harold Bloom. One definition of trauma theory
suggests that it includes both work around the experience of survivors
of the Holocaust and other catastrophic personal and collective
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experiences and the theoretical and methodological innovations that
might be derived from this work and applied more generally to film
and literary studies (SD, 194). The clinical work that has shaped
trauma theory is informed by a particular and specific type of psycho-
logical theory influenced by developments within US psychoanalytic
theory and its relation to the categorization of, on the one hand,
mental conditions and disabilities, and on the other, the ways in
which these categorizations are taken up within the domain of the
law (ST , 87–90).4 Critical to these developments has been the codi-
fication of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), as demonstrated
by the disorder’s inclusion and further elaboration in the third and
fourth editions of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American
Psychiatric Association,5 a development referred to in Caruth’s intro-
duction to Part I of Trauma: Explorations in Memory. Critical, too, has
been the development, particularly in the United States of a neuro-
scientific approach to memory disorders. In this work, a Freudian
emphasis on memory’s relations with unconscious conflict, repression
and fantasy is replaced by an understanding of memory as related to
brain functioning.6
Within the Humanities, as stated above, deconstruction was one
of the theories which, along with these clinical developments, most
shaped the emergence of trauma theory. Its influence can be traced
through repeated references to the work of Paul de Man (Caruth’s
erstwhile teacher) throughout Caruth’s Unclaimed Experience as well as
through a chapter devoted to him in Felman and Laub’s Testimony:
Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History. To put
things at their simplest, trauma theory appears to help the Humanities
move beyond the impasses and crises in knowledge posed by these
theories, without abandoning their insights. Trauma theory promises,
that is, not a way round the difficulties presented by these theories, but
a way through and beyond them. The short sections that follow will
critically discuss trauma theory’s claims to move through and beyond
those theoretical impasses.
Referentiality
If the critiques of referentiality derived from structuralism, post-
structuralism, psychoanalysis, semiotics and deconstruction suggest, in
their different ways, that representations bear only a highly mediated
or indirect relation to actuality, trauma theory moves through and
beyond that proposal by suggesting, as Thomas Elsaesser explains,
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that the traumatic event has ‘the status of a (suspended) origin in the
production of a representation (. . .) bracketed or suspended because
marked by the absence of traces’ (SD, 194). In place of theories that
emphasize the conventional, mediated, illusory, deferred or imaginary
status of the relation between representation and ‘actuality’ or ‘event’,
trauma theory suggests that the relation between representation and
‘actuality’ might be reconceived as one constituted by the absence of
traces. For Dori Laub, this absence of traces gives rise to his formula-
tion of the aetiology of trauma as ‘an event without a witness’ (TC,
75–92)— an absence of witnessing that derives, argues Caruth, from
the unassimilable or unknowable nature of the traumatic event (TEM ,
4; UE 1–17).
In trauma theory, this absence of traces testifies to a representation’s
relation to (a traumatic) event/actuality. In other words, trauma
theory constitutes, in Elsaesser’s words, ‘not so much a theory of
recovered memory as (. . .) one of recovered referentiality’ (SD, 201).
This emphasis on the referentiality of traumatic memory emerges
in Caruth’s introduction to the first section of Trauma: Explorations
in Memory, which begins with references to the ‘war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the increasing violence in the US’ (vii). It is revealed,
also, by the centrality accorded by Felman and Laub to Holocaust
testimony. This is clearly an interesting and refreshing move that
(again, as Elsaesser points out) might be taken up by historians, as well
as by media theorists. Yet at the same time, it takes the traumatic event
as its theoretical foundation. As we have seen, one of Laub’s chapters
in Testimony: Crises of Witnessing refers to trauma as an event without a
witness. An emphasis on the event is also found throughout Caruth’s
Unclaimed Experience, pre-figured by her opening account of Freud
wondering, in his Beyond The Pleasure Principle, ‘at the peculiar and
sometimes uncanny way in which catastrophic events seem to repeat
themselves’ (UE, 1, emphasis mine). This raises the question of the
meaning and implications of placing trauma at the very heart of a
general theory of representation, which would seem to follow from
the centrality to Caruth’s trauma theory of de Man’s general theory of
signification. To what extent, that is, are the insights offered by trauma
theory generalizable to the whole field of representation? While it
might be arguable that language and representation emerge from and
bear the mark of that primary break or separation constitutive of
subjectivity, to align this break with trauma would constitute, in my
view at least, a histrionic manoeuvre resulting in the pathologization
of all life lived through language and representation—of all life, that
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is, beyond very early infancy. Moreover, the generalizability of trauma
theory’s insights is brought into question by those very theories from
which trauma theory is derived. Trauma theory is derived, in part,
that is, from de Man’s theory of signification in general, and in part
from the neuroscientific studies of psychologists including Bessel A.
Van der Kolk, who have argued, in the words of Ruth Leys, that
‘the traumatic event is encoded in the brain in a different way from
ordinary memory’ (TG, 7).7 If trauma’s encoding is extraordinary,
then can that ‘encoding’ become the foundation for a general theory
of representation? These are questions that deserve further elaboration
and debate. For is it that theories of trauma are taken to illuminate the
relation between actuality and representation in general, or is it that
actuality is beginning to be taken as traumatic in and of itself?8 These
questions, crudely stated as they are here, risk becoming obfuscated, I
think, as the theory takes on a life of its own.
Subjectivity
A theory of subjectivity is implicit within trauma theory. One context
for this theory is the constant revising and re-reading of Freud’s
seminal texts, which has resulted, of course, in a plethora of different
schools of psychoanalytic and psychological theory. Over-simplifying
somewhat, trauma theory as it informs the Humanities has its psycho-
analytic foundations in what I’ll call the US-based ‘postmodernization’
of Freud.9 Here I am referring to neuroscientific work, as represented,
for instance, in the work of Van der Kolk and Van der Hart.10 Along-
side an emphasis on memory and brain function, this ‘postmodern’
psychology includes also a strand that emphasises intersubjectivity and
the role of the listener or witness in the bringing to consciousness
of previously unassimilated memory.11 The importance of witnessing
is illustrated particularly in Felman and Laub’s Testimony: Crises of
Witnessing, which moreover includes the term witness or witnessing
in the titles of four of its seven chapters. Though, as Antze has pointed
out, an emphasis on narrative, witnessing, and the intersubjectivity
of memory is at odds with the scientificity of neurobiology (TOI ,
97), in practice, trauma theory’s emphasis on witnessing as well as on
pathologies of dissociation demonstrates that it draws on both strands.
To date there has been little discussion or debate concerning either
the model of subjectivity implied by trauma theory, or the theoretical
difficulties negotiated by that model. What is it, in other words, that
trauma theory moves ‘through’ or ‘beyond’ in its construction of a
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traumatized subject? My response to this question takes as its starting
point Ruth Leys’s excellent genealogical study of trauma, in which
Leys demonstrates that contemporary trauma theory is still struggling
to resolve a contradiction that has underlain the US-based theories of
trauma since their inception— the contradiction, that is, between a
mimetic and an anti-mimetic theory of trauma. Leys accords a position
of centrality, within trauma’s genealogy, to ‘the problem of imitation,
defined as a problem of hypnotic imitation’ (TG, 8; original emphasis) and
makes the case that the hypnotized subject provided the template for
early psychoanalytic theories of traumatic memory. Leys points out
that far from being only a method of research and treatment of the
symptoms of trauma,
Hypnosis (. . .) played a major theoretical role in the conceptualisation of trauma
(. . .) because the tendency of hypnotized persons to imitate or repeat whatever
they were told to say or do provided a basic model for the traumatic experience.
Trauma was defined as a situation of dissociation or ‘absence’ from the self
in which the victim unconsciously imitated or identified with the aggressor or
traumatic scene in a situation that was likened to a state of heightened suggestibility
or hypnotic trance. (TG, 8–9)
Leys goes on to suggest that this tie between trauma and mimesis
proved troubling as it threatened the ideal of individual autonomy and
responsibility (TG, 9). The notion of subjects absent from themselves
and involuntarily mimicking a past traumatic experience threatened
to de-stabilize the sovereignty of those subjects. In the mimetic theory
of trauma, that is, traumatized subjects are neither fully in control
of nor in charge of themselves. As Leys explains, the unwelcome
implications of the mimetic theory of trauma led to the development,
alongside that theory, of ‘an anti-mimetic tendency to regard trauma
as if it were a purely external event coming to a sovereign if passive
victim’ (TG, 10; original emphasis). According to this this model,
the production of memories is no longer understood to be linked to
the unconscious, unbiddable, processes of the inner world. Instead,
memories are understood to be the unmediated, though unassimil-
able records of traumatic events. These memories are understood to
undergo ‘dissociation’, meaning that they come to occupy a specially
designated area of the mind that precludes their retrieval. Whereas in
the mimetic theory, trauma produces psychical dissociation from the
self, in the anti-mimetic theory, it is the record of an unassimilable
event which is dissociated from memory.
Trauma Theory: Contexts, Politics, Ethics 15
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Ruth Leys’s genealogy of trauma links the rise of an anti-mimetic
theory of trauma to the defence of an (ideological) commitment to
the sovereignty and autonomy of the subject. This linkage illuminates
what may be a problematic aspect of that US-based trauma theory
that is currently being imported into the Humanities in the UK and
elsewhere. For Ruth Leys, the ideological-political implications of
the anti-mimetic tendency within early formulations of trauma theory
are clear: its advantage was that it allowed the traumatic subject to
be theorized as sovereign, if passive. As Leys goes on to argue, it is
this anti-mimetic theory which ‘suppressed the mimetic-suggestive
paradigm in order to re-establish a strict dichotomy between the
autonomous subject and the external trauma’ (TG, 9).
For Leys, mimetic and anti-mimetic tendencies cannot be strictly
divided from each other. It is rather that the contradiction between
these tendencies has continued to shape psychology and psychoanal-
ysis. Leys argues that ‘from themoment of its invention in the late nine-
teenth century the concept of trauma has been fundamentally unstable,
balancing uneasily— indeed veering uncontrollably—between two
ideas, theories or paradigms’ (TG, 298). Nevertheless, it is possible
to read tendencies towards the mimetic or anti-mimetic paradigm
in theories of trauma. The trauma theory of Caruth and of Felman
and Laub emphasizes lack of recall and the unexperienced nature
of trauma. In these senses, it leans towards the mimetic paradigm.
However, trauma theory’s previously discussed emphasis on the event
itself links it clearly with the anti-mimetic theory of trauma. Leys
argues that whereas in the mimetic theory, the subject unconsciously
imitates or repeats the trauma, in the anti-mimetic theory the subject
is ‘essentially aloof from the traumatic experience (. . .). The anti-
mimetic theory is compatible with, and often gives way to, the idea
that trauma is a purely external event that befalls a fully consti-
tuted subject’ (TG, 299). This anti-mimetic tendency shapes Caruth’s
interpretation of Freud’s writings, which return, always, to trauma’s
relation to an event. Thus, she argues, for instance, that ‘the experience
that Freud will call ‘‘traumatic neurosis’’ emerges as the reenactment
of an event that one cannot simply leave behind’ (UE, 2; emphasis
mine).
Leys’s account of the differences between the anti-mimetic and
mimetic paradigms also draws attention to the question of the trauma-
tized subject’s relation to the aggressor.Whereas the mimetic paradigm
‘posits a moment of identification with the aggressor (. . .) the anti-
mimetic theory depicts violence as purely and simply an assault from
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without. This has the advantage of portraying the victim of trauma as
in no way mimetically complicitous with the violence directed against
her’ (TG, 299). The possibility of an identification with aggression is
markedly absent from the trauma theory of Caruth and Felman and
Laub, thus demonstrating further their theory’s alignment with the
anti-mimetic paradigm and the distance between their trauma theory
and the theory that I wish to advocate below.
Trauma theory’s readings of Freud contrast on several points with
contemporary re-readings of Freud undertaken largely in Europe by
recent interpreters including, in the UK, those of Object-Relations
theorists,12 and in France, Laplanche and Pontalis.13 Whether they
follow Object-Relations, or Laplanche, or post-Freudian theory more
generally, the psychoanalytic theories of trauma that I wish to advo-
cate here all emphasize unconscious conflict and mediation in the
formation of neuroses, even where what appears to be at stake is the
relation between a neurosis and memory of the past. These alterna-
tive approaches to trauma substitute for trauma theory’s emphasis on
the dissociation of unassimilated memories, a focus on the traumatic
nature of unconscious associations. Trauma theory’s topography of
the inner world dispenses with the layering of conscious/subconscious
and unconscious, substituting for them a conscious mind in which
past experiences are accessible, and a dissociated area of the mind
from which traumatic past experiences cannot be accessed. In Caruth,
and in Felman and Laub, it is the unexperienced nature of the event,
which give rise to PTSD. Caruth argues, for instance, that ‘[w]hat
returns in the flashback is not simply an overwhelming experience
that has been obstructed by a later repression or amnesia, but an
event that is itself constituted, in part, by its lack of integration into
consciousness’ (TEM , 152).
Depth has no intrinsic value, but trauma theory’s revised, depthless
topography of the mind entails the abandonment of Freud’s emphasis
on the mediating role of unconscious processes in the production of the
mind’s scenes14 and meanings, including those of memory. What is
lost— to put this even more baldly— is that fundamental psychoan-
alytic assumption concerning the challenge to the subject’s sovereignty
posed by the unconscious and its wayward processes15 —processes
which might include, but should not be limited to, an identifica-
tion with the aggressor. In alternative re-interpretations of Freud, it
is the unconscious production of associations to a memory, rather
than qualities intrinsic to certain events, that is understood to render
a memory traumatic. These associations have to be understood in
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relation to temporality and fantasy. Whereas for Caruth, it is the
memory of the event itself which arrives belatedly (see, for instance,
TEM , 4; UE, 17), for Laplanche and Pontalis, it is the meanings
conferred on it ‘afterwards’ that may render a particular memory trau-
matic (LP, 467–8). Leys makes a similar point when she argues that
‘for Freud traumatic memory is inherently unstable or mutable owing
to the role of unconscious motives that confer meaning on it’ (TG,
20). In the psychoanalytic theory that has developed in parallel to
that drawn on by trauma theory, then, a memory becomes traumatic
when it becomes associated, later, with inadmissible meanings, wishes,
fantasies, which might include an identification with the aggressor.
What I take from this is that it is not an event, which is by its nature
‘toxic’ to the mind, but what the mind later does to memory. One
British Object-Relations psychoanalyst has described this process in
the following terms:
Whatever the nature of the event (. . .) eventually he comes to make sense of it in
terms of the most troubled and troubling of the relationships between the objects
that are felt to inhabit his internal world. That way the survivor is at least making
something recognisable and familiar out of the extraordinary, giving it meaning.
(UT , 12)
It follows from this, as clinical researchers at the Tavistock Clinic have
recently documented, that the traumatization effect does not appear
to reside in the nature of the event. Some need no support after a
so-called trauma, while others need help.
Trauma theory’s sophistication and its associations with radical
academic work have become taken-for-granted. Yet it is a theory
which, on Leys’s account, implies a ‘forgetting’ of that radical de-
centring and de-stabilization of the subject— that emphasis on the
subject’s lack of sovereignty and its unconscious processes of mediation
and meaning-making—which continue to be central to those theories
with which trauma theory is still associated in the Humanities today.
It hardly needs re-stating that those theories—psychoanalysis, struc-
turalism, post-structuralism, deconstruction—whose aporias trauma
theory promises to negotiate, or move through, all problematize,
in different ways, and to different degrees, those very notions of
autonomy and sovereignty which lie at the heart of bourgeois
constructions of subjectivity. It is paradoxical, then, that contem-
porary trauma theory’s anti-mimetic emphasis on catastrophic events
can thus arguably be traced back to a theoretical shift made in
18 Paragraph
Paragraph 30-1 art2.tex V3 - March 12, 2007 8:46 P.M. Page 18
defence of a model of subjectivity critiqued by the very theo-
ries— structuralism, post-structuralism, psychoanalysis, deconstruc-
tion—with which trauma theory in the Humanities is explicitly
associated and through which, rather than against which, its exponents
believe themselves to be travelling.
One of the foundational insights brought to the Humanities by
psychoanalysis, for instance, concerned the subject’s unconscious
activities of condensation, displacement and symbolization. This
insight enabled the Humanities to develop a model of the subject
not as passive yet sovereign, but as engaged in processes of desire and
meaning-making over which it lacked full conscious control. This
model of a de-centred subject caught up in processes of symboliza-
tion, desire and fear that lie partly beyond the reach of consciousness
has been central to the development of contemporary understand-
ings of the production, negotiation and mediation of culture. The
significance of these arguments for any discussion of trauma theory’s
value for the Humanities resides in trauma theory’s abandonment of
any emphasis on the radical ungovernability of the unconscious. In
trauma theory, it is the event rather than the subject, which emerges
as unpredictable or ungovernable. I make this point not in the interest
of diverting attention from the actuality of historical catastrophes and
the suffering caused, but to stress that cultural theory needs to attend
to the inter- and intra-subjective processes through which meanings
are conferred, negotiated and mediated. The exploration of hidden,
unconscious processes of desire or fear-driven meaning-making have
proved immensely valuable in cultural theory’s engagement with
psychoanalysis to date. Dissociation retreats from this insight since, in
place of those ungovernable processes of the mind that are constitutive
of meaning and affect, it substitutes an event’s inassimilable nature.
In this new trauma theory it is the nature of the event itself which
prompts its dissociation.
Something else gets lost, too, in trauma theory’s retreat from
the significance of unconscious process to the process of memory
formation and revision. An emphasis on the centrality of unconscious
process to all aspects of psychical life has the effect of reminding readers
and analysts of two important aspects of that life. First, a fundamental
tenet of psychoanalysis is that of a continuum of psychical states.
Psychoanalysis avoids any radical differentiation between the ‘normal’
and the ‘pathological’. Trauma theory, on the other hand, does tend
to distinguish between the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’. One has
either been present at or has ‘been’ traumatized by a terrible event
Trauma Theory: Contexts, Politics, Ethics 19
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or one has not. Second, whereas psychoanalysis takes the ‘darker side
of the mind’ for granted, emphasizing the ubiquity of inadmissible
sexual fantasies, for instance, trauma theory suggests, rather that the
‘darkness’ comes only from outside. Hence the relevance of Leys’s
already noted comments concerning the anti-mimetic paradigm’s
‘depiction of violence as purely and simply an assault from without’
(TG, 299). This perspective has recently been challenged by Caroline
Garland, who, writing of the difference between perspectives on
trauma in the US and at the Tavistock Clinic in London, emphasises
that the Tavistock Clinic’s view is that
[I]n the internal world there is no such thing as an accident, there is no such
thing as forgetting and there is no such thing as an absence of hatred, rage or
destructiveness (. . .) in spite of the urge in survivors to attribute all badness to the
world outside them that caused their misfortune. (UT , 5)
What I’m suggesting, then, is that notwithstanding the sophistica-
tion of trauma theory’s underpinnings in De Manian or Derridean
deconstruction it nevertheless offers a theory of the subject which
retreats from psychoanalysis’s rejection of a black-and-white vision of
psychical life to produce a theory which establishes clear, not to say
Manichean binaries of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘trauma’ and ‘normality’,
and ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’.
Ruth Leys explains that Cathy Caruth’s work is informed by that of
the deconstructionist theorist Paul De Man, characterizing Caruth’s
position as a
deconstructive version of Van der Kolk’s neurobiological account of trauma
[in which] the gap or aporia in consciousness and representation that is held to
characterize the individual traumatic experience comes to stand for the ‘materiality
of the signifier’. (TG, 266)
Trauma theory, then, arguably moves through and beyond the ‘revela-
tion’ of the subject’s incoherence or ‘de-facement’. It moves through
and beyond modernity’s supposition of a coherent, autonomous,
knowing subject, but without simply rendering subjectivity incoherent,
unknowing, fragmented. But perhaps it does this (as Leys suggests)
while holding, in a relatively hidden way, to a notion of a sovereign
yet passive subject. Is this the route through ‘post’ theories that trauma
theory is really producing? And is this a model of subjectivity which,
if made explicit, would be followed by those who espouse the theory?
And if Humanities theory is beginning to substitute a passive but
sovereign subject, for a subject caught up in processes not all of
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which are available for conscious control, how might that shift best be
contextualized and evaluated? These are, I think, questions that invite
further consideration.
Subjectivity, Forgetting and Testimony
The subject of trauma theory is characterized by that which it does
not know/remember (UC, 4–7; TEM 1–5). This is not a subject
caught up in desire, but a subject constituted by forgetting. The inner
world of the traumatized subject is characterized not by repression of
unacknowledgeable fantasies but by dissociated memories— traceless
traces. Though the subject of trauma theory cannot be restored to
coherence through acts of remembrance, a belated acknowledgement
of that which has been forgotten is a possibility (TEM , 4). The trau-
matized subject can remember its having forgotten, if you like—can
acknowledge the gaps and absences. Most importantly, this act of
‘recovery’ takes place in relation to a witness. Testimony, as the title of
Felman and Laub’s seminal text confirms and as Caruth demonstrates
(see specially UC, 108), is a term foregrounded in trauma theory. It
refers to a relation of witnessing between the subject of trauma and
the listener. According to Felman and Laub, testimony (to trauma)
demands a witness and it is only within the context of witnessing that
testimony to trauma is possible. In this relation, some testimony can
be made to trauma’s ‘traceless traces’. What needs emphasizing here is
trauma theory’s moving beyond modernity’s coherent, autonomous,
knowing subject to a model of subjectivity grounded in the space
between witness and testifier within which that which cannot be
known can begin to be witnessed. This may seem to contradict my
earlier argument concerning trauma theory’s re-institution of subjec-
tive sovereignty. However, the model of subjectivity inscribed in
theories of testimony conforms to Leys’s description: the knowledge
this subject lacks is not that of its own unconscious process, but of an
event that cannot be remembered.
In trauma theory, then, it is almost as though the topographical
flattening out of the psyche that substitutes dissociation for repression
displaces previously intra-psychical processes of displacement into the
space of the inter-subjective. Processes of dialogic meaning-making
between testifier and witness arguably take the place, that is, of those
intra-psychical yet socially shaped unconscious processes of repres-
sion, mediation andmeaning-making foregrounded in psychoanalysis’s
alternative understanding of traumatic memory.16
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History
The foregrounding of questions of testimony and witness establish
trauma theory’s pertinence to the discipline and practice of history.
Trauma theory is associated with the ‘turn to memory’ in history
as well as in the Humanities more generally. Postmodernism’s prob-
lematizations of grand narratives, objectivity, universality and totality
prompted a turn to memory’s partial, local and subjective narratives.
Moreover, postmodernism’s questioning of history’s authoritative
truth-claims arose, in part, in relation to a consideration of the Holo-
caust, the impact of which has been linked to the impossibility of
both representation and remembrance. It is telling, therefore, that
Shoshana Felman writes towards the beginning of Testimony that
Adorno’s famous dictum concerning poetry after Auschwitz did not
imply that poetry could no longer and should no longer be written,
but that it must write ‘through’ its own impossibility (TC, 34). By
analogy, trauma theory arguably constitutes one attempt by history to
think itself ‘through’ a post-Auschwitz world. If history was already
arguing, that is, that events were always ‘without a witness’— in
that though events happened, they could only be known ‘afterwards’
through representation, through language, through the always partial
and situated discourses and languages of their telling, trauma theory
constituted the ‘limit-text’ of this position— since to use Hayden
White’s problematic term, ‘holocaustal’ events ‘cannot be simply
forgotten (. . .) but neither can they be adequately remembered’.17
Trauma theory attempts to move through this position in a number
of ways: through theories of testimony, as exemplified in the work
of Felman and Laub (TC), through reaching for modes of represen-
tation better suited to the ‘unrepresentability’ of trauma than realism
(ME), and by deploying psychoanalytic understandings of trauma’s
belatedness to reveal testimony to trauma’s traceless traces ‘after’ the
event.
History’s attempt to think itself through a ‘post-Auschwitz’ world
and the links between this attempt and the challenges posed to
history by ‘post’ theories more generally all led it, then, in the
direction of memory— and traumatic memory in particular (ST ,
81–90). The take-up within history of perspectives informed by
theories of testimony and trauma arguably evidences that tendency
to retain a model of the subject as the sovereign yet passive ‘victim’
of events found in trauma theory more generally. This is perhaps
understandable, given history’s primary concerns with deeds and
happenings. Yet contemporary history’s dominant tendency to link
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or oppose history to memory, to the near exclusion of other terms
including fantasy and the imaginary,18 does invite some discussion.
Analysts and Readers: The Ethics and Politics of Trauma Analysis
Theories of trauma, testimony and witnessing are currently informing
literary, film and media studies. This work shares in common a drive to
engage with and reveal trauma’s ‘traceless’ (SD, 199) or absent textual
presence. Usually, though not always, taking as their objects texts
explicitly concerned with personal or collective catastrophe, trauma
analysis aims to demonstrate the ways in which texts may be engaged
with the belated remembrance of trauma. There is much that remains
to be decided concerning the theories and methods of trauma analysis.
For instance, trauma analysis has yet to debate how, given trauma’s
unrepresentability, the initial choice of texts for analysis is to be made,
and whether it can be assumed, as criticism to date seems to have
accepted, that it will be texts explicitly concerned with catastrophe
that are most likely to reveal trauma’s absent traces. Yet, though there
is much that remains to be debated concerning every aspect of trauma
analysis, the open debate of trauma analysis’s grounding theories, and
of the readings that it produces are hindered by the nature of the
material itself and the contexts—particularly in conferences—within
which it is discussed. Criticism and debate can easily appear callous,
or even unethical, in a context where an audience is being asked to
bear witness to unspeakable sufferings. This can lead, however, to a
silencing of discussion which leaves hanging any number of questions
about the continuingly problematic nature of academic discussion of
trauma and the apparent acceptability of debate only of certain types
of material and not others. Yet if self-reflexivity is a sine qua non of
all cultural analysis, then there are three aspects of trauma analysis that
do invite some reflection: first, the construction of and positioning of
the trauma text’s analyst; second, the fascinations of trauma and, third,
the designation of the field to be included by trauma analysis.
Though trauma analysis is in its early stages of development, its
ethical imperatives do appear to have been accepted: trauma analysis
positions itself by analogy with the witness or addressee of testimony
to trauma and understands its task as that of facilitating the cultural
remembrance and working-through of those traumas whose absent
presence marks the analysed text/s. That compassion constitutes a
central drive of trauma analysis is beyond dispute. Yet what needs to
be reflected upon is the tendency of trauma analysis to foreground
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the analyst’s sensitivity and empathic capacities. In this regard, trauma
analysis arguably revises that Leavisite emphasis on fineness of response
that was the butt of such extensive critique within the theories from
which trauma theory appears to draw breath. Carolyn Steedman’s
comments on the historical genealogy, particularly in the eighteenth
century, of what she calls ‘Empathy Theory’19 provide a timely
corrective to the view that the display of empathy, in cultural criticism,
is simply to be welcomed:
Using [empathy] theory, a sense of self (. . .) was articulated, through the use of
someone else’s story of suffering, loss, exploitation, pain (. . .). In those moments of
vibrating reception, when the heart throbs in sympathy andwe are sublimely aware
of the harmony of our reactions with those of the person we are sympathising
with, it seems necessary, an absolute rock-bottom line of exchange, that he or
she who tells the harrowing tale, is diminished by having that story to tell; and is
subordinated in the act of telling. (FA, 34)
Steedman’s timely remarks invite a greater degree of reflexivity
concerning the ethics of trauma criticism. For what she reveals is
that critical ‘empathy’ is not without its darker aspects. As well as
partaking of a discourse of power that establishes the critic’s sensibility
as ‘finer’ than that of nameless others, the empathetic recovery of
the voices of traumatized testifiers and texts may be at the expense
of those for whom trauma criticism claims to speak. In this context,
it is perhaps salutary to be reminded, also (as the insights of psycho-
analysis of any hue would demonstrate), that a focus on texts of
catastrophe and suffering is bound to be inflected, also, by less easily
acknowledgeable fascinations and fantasies concerning victimhood
grounded in aggressivity,20 or a drive to voyeurism and control.21
Such responses have been identified amongst those only indirectly
caught up in actual disasters. As David Alexander, director of the
Aberdeen Centre for Trauma Research, recently pointed out, trauma
sites and trauma victims frequently become the objects of voyeuristic,
or triumphalist fascination.22 Through such manoeuvres, those not
directly affected by a catastrophe shield themselves from the awareness
of what might have been by means of sadistic fantasies of control
and/or blame. At the same time, trauma sites, victims and texts also
proffer the potential for a masochistic identification with victimhood.
Trauma analysis might gain from considering the possibility, then, that
its impetus to engage with trauma may be shaped, to some degree, by
these less easily acknowledgeable fascinations.
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There is one sense in which trauma analysis’s investment of power
in the analyst or reader is explicit. Trauma theory emphasises the
dialogic nature of testimony. Yet notwithstanding its analogous rela-
tion to testimonial witnessing, trauma analysis appears to dispense with
the insights of contemporary media and literary studies concerning the
complex processes of meaning negotiation that take place between
texts and their various spectators/readers, and invests the analyst with
immensely and conclusively authoritative interpretative capacities. It
seems that it is the analyst, and the analyst alone, who is able to discern
trauma’s absent traces. In this regard, trauma theory seems to return us
to an almost Althusserian moment, in which the authoritative analyst
alone is invested with the capacity to perceive the truth of representa-
tion. This scenario diverges considerably from that of the opening up
of texts to multiple, contestable, divergent or contradictory readings
that have been bequeathed to the Humanities by readings informed
by, for instance, psychoanalysis and deconstruction. It diverges, too,
from the stress placed by cultural studies on the situated, local and
multiple readings of historically specific readers and audiences. To put
it this way, for whom, when, where and in what circumstances are
particular texts read or experienced as trauma texts?
A further and related question that remains hanging, due to the
difficulty of debating trauma analysis, hinges on which events, expe-
riences and texts are to be classed as traumatic and which are to be
excluded from this category. This is problematic since, to put things at
their most stark, trauma criticism arguably constructs and polices the
boundary of what can be recognised as trauma—a position made all
the more powerful by trauma theory’s insistence on the ‘tracelessness’
or invisibility of trauma to all but the most trained of eyes. It should be
obvious by now that the thrust of my argument is not that the bound-
aries of trauma criticism’s reach should be expanded, but rather that
questions remain concerning the inclusions and exclusions performed
by this criticism. Why is it, for instance, that there has been so little
attention, within trauma theory, to the recent sufferings of those in
Rwanda, in comparison to the attention that has been focused on
events in the US on 9/11? The questions of firstly, who it is that gets
claimed by trauma theory, and who ignored, and secondly, which
events get labelled ‘trauma’ and which do not have not been omitted,
entirely, from critical commentary. For example, writing of 9/11,
James Berger has recently pointed out that ‘events of comparable and
greater devastation in terms of loss of life happen in other parts of
the world quite regularly’,23 yet, he implies, have not been subject
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to trauma criticism’s empathic attention. Berger makes the point that
while some events get labelled traumatic, others, quite patently do
not. Moreover, it is the sufferings of those categorized, in the West
as ‘other’, that tend not to be addressed via trauma theory—which
becomes in this regard, a theory that supports politicized constructions
of those with whom identifications via traumatic sufferings can be
forged and those from whom such identifications are withheld. This
is not, as I have already argued, a call to extend trauma’s reach— it is
rather a call to attend to this aspect of the politics of trauma theory.
Steedman’s essay on the making and writing of the self from the
seventeenth century onwards offers some thoughts on testimony that
are, in the context of these questions, both pertinent and potentially
salutary. In Steedman’s account, the realist novels of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries constructed subjectivity—constructed the bour-
geois autobiographical I— through two processes of ‘colonization’.
These novels constructed subjectivity, using as a template the forced
courtroom testimonies of subordinate others. These testimonies were
then ‘taken over’ in the first-person writings of the middle classes,
who modelled their ‘I’ on these induced autobiographies. Further,
Steedman suggests, as we have already seen, that where, in novels of
this period, the narrative dwells on the experiences of an ‘other’, the
narrator and reader place themselves in the position of feeling and
displaying the fineness of their response to these tales of suffering.
But if, as Steedman suggests, these autobiographical acts construct
their subjects through a ‘colonization’ of the stories of others, which
also become the means by which the sensitivity of the narrating and
reading subject is produced, perhaps contemporary trauma criticism’s
exclusions reveal that there are some ‘others’ who are not even worthy
of such colonization. In this light, the question of trauma criticism’s
exclusions and inclusions becomes both more pressing, yet increas-
ingly complex. For to be included within trauma criticism’s reach may
be to become subject to its drive to construct an empathic listening
subject and a subjectivity modelled on those narratives to which it
attends. Yet those whose excessive otherness excludes them from
trauma criticism’s incorporative drives also find themselves beyond
trauma criticism’s empathic reach.
Trauma criticism has no greater claim to ethical purity than any
other critical practice. Like any other intellectual endeavour, it is
driven by a complex interweaving of scholarly, academic, political
and psychical imperatives. Yet trauma criticism has emerged at a time
when the capacity to sustain an awareness of ethical equivocalness in
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the West, at least, appears attenuated, and when the cultural mood,
policies and analyses proffered by politicians and the media verge on
Manicheanism. The rule of Manicheanism can be glimpsed, I think,
in responses to 9/11. Nancy Miller, commenting on the ‘Portraits
of Grief’ series run post 9/11 in the New York Times, remarked that
the stories told in this series were always of fulfilment, happiness, and
kindness:
I can’t say I cried reading these portraits. On the contrary, I often experienced a
powerful sense of disbelief (. . .); was it possible that no one who died in the attack
on the WTC was ever depressed (. . .) self-centred (. . .) without a passion (. . .)
had a career that seemed stalled (. . .) or sometimes found life not worth living?
(TAH, 46)
Miller points to and critiques that Manicheanism which underpins the
culture within which trauma theory has gained ground—a culture of
pure innocence and pure evil and of ‘the War against Evil’.
As Berger has pointed out, in the contemporary West, the framing
that follows on from the utter uncertainty produced by catastrophe
names the time of that catastrophe as apocalyptic, and heralds a ‘world
said to be clarified and simplified—a struggle of good versus evil,
civilization versus barbarianism [. . .]. Are you with us or against us’
(TAH , 56). If scholarship is to move beyond, rather than mirror
such defensive responses, in times when they appear to have become
ubiquitous, it needs to sustain rather than retreat from an awareness of
both ambiguity, and of the inevitability of ethical impurity. Trauma
theory needs, that is, to act as a check against, rather than a vehicle of
the Manichean tendencies currently dominant within western politics
and culture.
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